strategy choices of the adversary. But that may change the incentives of the players, and in particular, the propensity to play this or that strategy. This invalidates the whole process.
The crux of the difficulty is that games of strategy are delicate objects: any modification of the definition of a game, however innocuous at first sight, may change the nature of the game and the behavior of the players. Accordingly, we must take the game as given, also when analyzing a player's preferences. This paper starts from the premise that a player (the protagonist) has well-defined preferences over the outcomes of the game, over the pure strategies open to her, and over lotteries among these elements. We impose on these preferences consistency requirements identical to those used for games against nature. We show that these preferences imply existence of a utility function on the outcomes, and a probability distribution on the strategies of the other players, such that the preferences over lotteries (and hence over mixed strategies) are consistent with expected utility maximization. Though probabilities need not be unique (Section VB), expected utilities are unique.
In order to interpret that result, we show that it also obtains when analyzing a game against nature where the decision maker must choose one from a given set of acts, 2 and preferences are elicited only for these acts, their consequences, and lotteries among these elements.
Thus, expected utility maximization emerges under the same premises and with the same characterization in strategic games and in games against nature. In that sense, the dichotomy vanishes altogether.
Section I describes our framework informally. Section II sets forth our main result informally. Section III is devoted to mathematical preliminaries, Section IV to the formal statement of our result, Section V to discussion, Sections VI and VII to proofs, and Section VIII to the literature.
I. A Common Framework
It will be useful to use the same terminology for games against nature (GANs) and for strategic games (SGs). In either case, the "adversary"-be it nature or an interested party or parties-has several alternatives, called strategies of the adver sary. The decision maker-henceforth protagonist-also has several alternatives, called strategies of the protagonist. Together, the strategies of the adversary and of the protagonist determine the outcome of the game. Thus, each of the protagonist's strategies may be thought of as a function from the adversary's strategies to the possible outcomes: an "act" in the terminology of Savage (1954) , a "horse lottery" in that of Anscombe and Aumann (1963) 
(henceforth A-A).
A game (either GAN or SG) is thus defined by the set c 5 5c 6 of outcomes (consequences), the set r 5 5r6 of strategies available to the protagonist (acts), the set S 5 5s 6 of strategies available to the adversary (states), and 3 an outcome function h, which associates a consequence h 1r, s 2 with each strategy pair 1r, s 2.
Following standard practice in decision theory, we rely on the primitive concept of "preference." Preferences are applied to outcomes c as well as to strategies r. To obtain cardinal preferences, we introduce lotteries, defined as objective probability distributions. A mixed consequence is a lottery on consequences, an element g of the set D1c2 of lotteries on c. A mixed strategy is an element r of the set D1r2 of lotteries on r. In order to calibrate utilities for the elements of c and r to the same scale, we introduce hybrid lotteries, i.e., elements l of the set D1r < c2 5: D.
Operationally, such a lottery l results either in (a) the outright selection of a specified pure outcome of the game, or in (b) the game being played, with the protagonist choosing a specified pure strategy. More specifically, alternative (b) results in awarding to the protagonist the outcome associated by the game with a specified strategy of the protagonist, combined with the strategy actually chosen by the adversary when playing the game. For each strategy s of the adversary, l yields a mixed consequence l s in a natural way: if l chose a consequence, then l s chooses the same consequence; and if l chose a pure strategy r, then l s chooses the outcome of the game when the protagonist chooses r and the adversary chooses s. Note that all mixed consequences are in D, as are all mixed strategies; thus the preferences on D apply also to mixed consequences and to mixed strategies.
If a hybrid lottery l results in the game G :5 1c, r, S, h 2 being played, the definition of G is fully respected, and it will be played as such, irrespective of what consequence c may have been specified by l as a mutually exclusive alternative to G.
II. Main Result
The following two assumptions are made: N-M: The preference order satisfies the usual assumptions of von NeumannMorgenstern utility theory; and MONOTONICITy: If one hybrid lottery l always yields a mixed consequence preferred to that yielded by another one l9, no matter what the adversary does, then l is preferred to l9; likewise for weak preference. Condition (i) says that the utility u and the probabilities p represent the preferences numerically. Condition (ii) says that though the subjective probabilities are not unique, they are "payoff equivalent," in that for each of the alternatives available to the protagonist, all yield the same payoff. The theorem applies to games of strategy as well as to games against nature, through suitable interpretation of the common framework.
III. Formal Treatment: Preliminaries
The set of all probability distributions 6 on a finite set A is denoted D1A2. Note that if a, a9 [ D1A2 and t [ 10, 12 , then also ta 1 11 2 t 2 a9 [ D1A2. Abusing our notation, we write a and a interchangeably if a assigns probability 1 to a; that is, we do not distinguish between a and a lottery that chooses a with certainty. 
IV. Formal Treatment: The Main Theorem
The viewpoint taken here is that of a single player, the protagonist, also called rowena; it is her 10 subjective probabilities for the strategy choices of the other players that we will define. Also, the preferences appearing below are hers, as are the utilities. It is convenient to combine all the other players into a single one, called colin; we will see that no loss of generality is involved.
A game G consists of
• a finite set r with members r (Rowena's pure strategies),
• a finite set S with members s (Colin's pure strategies),
• a finite set c with members c ( pure consequences), and • a function h : r 3 S S c (the outcome function). , a monotonic N-M preference order on D; so in particular, s , |D1c2 is an N-M preference order on D1c2 , so has an N-M utility u, unique up to positive linear transformations.
MAIN THEOREM (formal statement):
There exists a probability distribution p on S, such that for any hybrid lotteries l, l9,
and, if p * is another such probability distribution, then for any hybrid lottery l,
For hybrid lotteries l, define
because of (4), this does not depend on p, so (3) becomes (6) l s , l9 if and only if u 1l2 $ u 1l92.
In words, Rowena evaluates lotteries by their expected utility, which is uniquely defined on D (up to positive linear transformations). Note that the Main Theorem applies to GANs as well as to SGs.
V. Discussion

A. GANs and SGs
In a game against nature, nature is oblivious to the protagonist and her options; therefore, even if her options change, her probabilities for nature's choices should not. In a strategic game, the adversary takes the protagonist's options into account when choosing his strategy; therefore, if the protagonist's options change, her probabilities for the adversary's choices may well change.
In GANs, the standard approach (Savage 1954 (Savage , A-A 1963 to defining the protagonist's probability for a particular state s of nature uses a strategy r s of the protagonist that yields her utility 1 if s occurs, 0 otherwise. Her probability for s is then defined as her utility u 1r s 2 for this strategy; in words, the number p such that she would as soon have a dollar with objective 12 probability p as a dollar if nature chooses s. If r s is not available in the given GAN, just add it; as noted above, the protagonist's probability for s should not be affected.
In SGs, this does not work, because adding r s to the protagonist's options does affect her probabilities for s-again, as noted above.
The approach described in the preceding sections overcomes the difficulty by restricting attention to those strategies that are actually available to the protagonist in the given game; adding r s is forbidden. While the method was developed for SGs, formally it applies equally well to GANs; specifically, to GANs in which the set of strategies available to the protagonist is-for whatever reason-restricted. Thus the formal distinction between GANs and SGs vanishes completely.
But conceptually, an important distinction between the two does remain. In GANs, even when the protagonist's strategies are in fact restricted, she can imagine the strategy r s , and so evaluate it. But in SGs, adding r s changes the adversary's view of the game; therefore imagining r s cannot lead to a coherent definition 13 of the protagonist's subjective probabilities.
B. Nonuniqueness and Payoff Equivalence
The subjective probabilities in the Main Theorem need not be unique. A simple example is a two-person game whose matrix has two identical columns, in which case the total subjective probability assigned to both columns can be divided between them in an arbitrary way. They are, however, payoff equivalent, in the sense that for 12 "Objective" probabilities are associated with coin tosses, roulette spins, and the like. 13 See the item entitled "Ignorance" in Section VD. a given utility function on the consequences, all subjective probability distributions satisfying the Main Theorem yield the same expected utility for each hybrid lottery. That is condition (4) in the formal statement of the Main Theorem.
Thus, consider a three-way election for president of a certain country, with candidates A, B, and c. If the protagonist must choose between getting utility 1 with certainty and a bet that yields utility 2 if A wins and 0 otherwise, then our procedure will uniquely determine only her probability p A for A winning. For the probabilities p B and p c that B or c will win, we can say only that they sum to 1 2 p A , but nothing about their individual values; this is the nonuniqueness. The payoff equivalence says that the individual values of p B and p c don't matter to the protagonist when making her choice; she should choose the bet if and only if p A . 1/2.
C. Hybrid Lotteries
Hybrid lotteries may be interpreted as strategies in extensive games of a kind often seen in real life. Specifically, each hybrid lottery l may be seen as yielding a mixed strategy r with probability t, and a mixed outcome g with the complementary probability 1 2 t. Denote by G l the extensive game in which nature chooses, with respective probabilities t and 1 2 t, whether G is to be played or whether the outcome is to be g; then the lottery l is equivalent (for the protagonist Rowena) to playing r in G l . One would not expect the adversary Colin to play G l differently 14 from G, so the protagonist's preferences between the different lotteries l accurately reflect her estimate of how the adversary will play G. Some readers have asked whether considering hybrid lotteries is like considering the original game to which one has added acts yielding Rowena a constant, independent of Colin's choice. The answer is no. Rowena cannot use constant acts that are not in r when playing the game; Colin knows this, and, indeed it is commonly known.
D. Some dead Ends
"Admissible" Preferences.-One might have thought it sufficient to work with the space D1c2 < D1r2 consisting only of mixed consequences and mixed strategies, rather than the much larger space D1c < r2 of hybrid lotteries. Preferences on D1c2 < D1r2 induce preferences on each of D1c2 and D1r2 , and a "matching" of D1c2 with D1r2. Call the preferences on D1c2 < D1r2 admissible if each of the induced preference orders is N-M, the one on D1r2 is monotonic, and there is also monotonicity as "between" D1c2 and D1r2; i.e., if Rowena (weakly) prefers a mixed consequence g to all outcomes of a mixed strategy r, no matter what Colin does, then she (weakly) prefers g to r, and similarly in the opposite direction. In utility terms, we get N-M utility functions u on D1c2 and D1r2 that are calibrated to the same scale, so that it is meaningful to compare the utilities of mixed consequences and mixed 14 For each player i, the matrix of G l is obtained from that of G by multiplying the whole matrix by the constant t and adding the constant 112t 2 u i 1g2 , where u i is i's utility.
strategies, and appropriate to use the same notation-u-for both. Admissibility is about all one can ask for without going to hybrid lotteries; but it is not enough to yield utilities and subjective probabilities representing the preferences. For example, consider Game 1 (see display), consequences c being denoted by their utilities u 1c 2. Suppose u 1T 2 5 3/4 and u 1B2 5 1/2. This induces an admissible preference order 15 on D1c2 < D1r2. If q were the subjective probability of Colin's playing left, condition 152 in Section IV would yield 3 /4 5 u 1T2 5 q # 1 1 11 2 q 2 # 0 5 q, and 1/2 5 u 1B2 5 q # 2/3 1 11 2 q 2 # 1/3, so q 5 1/2, a contradiction.
Game 1
Separate Preferences on Strategies and consequences.-Another potential option is to forgo the "matching" between D1c2 and D1r2 1which "drives" the above example), and to proceed from separate N-M preference orders on D1c2 and D1r2 , obeying monotonicity on D1r2. With this, one does get utilities and subjective probabilities representing the preferences. Indeed, we have the following: But here, payoff equivalence (the analogue of condition (4) in Section IV), is not guaranteed. Indeed, consider Game 2 (see display), where, as before, consequences are denoted by their utilities. The relation T s , B fully determines a preference order on D1r2 , which is represented by p 5 1p L , p r 2 5 1t, 1 2 t 2 for any t in the half-open interval 11/2, 14 . The corresponding utilities are u 1T2 5 t and u 1B2 5 1 2 t, which are of course different for different t.
15 Monotonicity on D1r2 is vacuously fulfilled, since for mixed strategies r and r9, preferences between r L and r9 L are opposite to those between r r and r9 r . As between D1c2 and D1r2 , let r :5 aT 1 11 2 a 2B [ D1r2 . Then r ~ 1/2 1 1/4a, which is always strictly between the consequences 2/3 1 1/3a and 1/3 2 1/3a that may result when r is played. Thus if g is $ each r s , then g $ 2/3 1 1/3a . 1/2 1 1/4a ~ r, and if each r s is $ g, then r ~ 1/2 1 1/4a . 1/3 2 1/3a $ g. The failure of payoff equivalence is a serious drawback, as the utilities of strategies are not calibrated to the same scale as those of consequences; the protagonist has no clear idea of what using a particular strategy is worth to her. So if we are to keep the game unchanged, hybrid lotteries remain as the only satisfactory option for defining the protagonist's subjective probabilities.
Side Bets.-The standard approach to defining the protagonist's subjective probabilities in games against nature relies on "side bets." In such a bet she gets, in addition to her payoff from the game, an amount d if the adversary plays a specified strategy s; nothing else is changed. One then defines her probability for s as that number p such that she would as soon opt for the side bet, as for d with objective probability p.
In strategic games this doesn't work because, as we said in the introduction, side bets may change the game. For example, 16 in the coordination game G 1 below, one may expect the Pareto dominant outcome Br. A side bet on L in the amount of d 5 8 adds 8 to the row player's payoffs in column L, i.e., transforms the game to G 2 . If side bets "don't matter," we should expect Br in G 2 as well. By the same token, adding 8 to the column player's payoffs in row T of G 2 should not matter; this yields G 3 , commonly known as the "Stag Hunt." 17 But here Br, which is Pareto dominated by TL, is far from compelling; indeed, John C. Harsanyi and Reinhard Selten (1987) select Br in G 1 and TL in G 3 .
L r T 9, 1 0, 0
Side bets leave most equilibrium notions-including that of Nash (1951) and correlated equilibrium (Aumann 1974 )-invariant. Nevertheless, they subtly change incentives, as the example shows. 16 Communicated by Sergiu Hart. To avoid difficulties, assume dollar payoffs and linear utilities. 17 See Barry O'Neill (1994, 1004-5) for a discussion of this game and some of the literature on it.
Ignorance.-As discussed in Section VA, in GANs the probability of a state s of nature is Rowena's utility for a strategy r s yielding utility 1 if s occurs, 0 if not. In SGs this does not work because r s is usually unavailable to Rowena; adding it may change Colin's view of the game, and so Rowena's probability that he chooses s.
One might think it enough to imagine a situation in which r s really is available to Rowena, but colin does not know that it is, so his choices-and Rowena's probabilities for his making those choices-are not affected. But that is not very satisfactory. What does Rowena think about Colin's state of mind? If she considers it possible that he considers it possible that r s is available to her, then that already changes the game, and we have the same difficulty as before. If not, then she knows that he knows that it is unavailable. But then how can it be available? There is a basic incoherence in situations where something false is "known."
Adding dominated Strategies.-Though in SGs, adding r s may in general change Rowena's probabilities for Colin's choices, one might think that that is not so when r s is strictly dominated. If so, we could define Rowena's probabilities as follows: without loss of generality, take all of Rowena's payoffs in the given game to be . 1; otherwise, simply recalibrate the utility function. Now, for each strategy s of Colin, add the strategy r s of Rowena. She will not use this strategy, as it is strictly dominated; so for practical purposes, the game appears unchanged, and Rowena's utility for r s should constitute an adequate definition of her probability that Colin chooses s.
But on closer examination, this, too, breaks down. To eliminate the possibility that Rowena will use a strictly dominated strategy, Colin must know that she is rational. So if adding r s is not to affect Rowena's probabilities of Colin's choices, she must know that he knows that she is rational. For this, we must assume at least second-order knowledge of rationality, which in a general theory of probability assessments in games is unacceptably strong.
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In fact, more than second-order knowledge of rationality is needed; nothing less than common knowledge of rationality will do. If Colin does not know that Rowena knows that he knows she is rational, then he might think that she thinks that he thinks she might use r s ; in that case he would choose accordingly, so the game would be essentially affected after all. So he does have to know that, and she must know that he knows it. And so on.
E. The utility of Playing a Game
The utility of playing a game for the protagonist is naturally defined as the utility of her most preferred strategy. That this is well-defined is a consequence of payoff equivalence; for example, if one uses only the Auxiliary Theorem, then one does not get a utility for playing the game.
We purposely use the term "utility"-rather than value-since in game theory "value" means something else. For example, the value of tic-tac-toe is a draw, whereas the utility of playing a round of the game could be, say, a win, depending on how the protagonist assesses the situation. In brief, one might say that the utility is an expectation, whereas the value is a rational expectation; for further discussion, see Aumann and Dreze (2008, section VIIC) .
F. Beliefs about Beliefs
The method described here yields the protagonist's probability assessments of what the adversary will do, but not of what he believes. Belief systems (or hierarchies), which embody players' probability assessments of each other's probability assessments, have played a central role in game theory for over forty years, ever since the pioneering work of Harsanyi (1967-68) . The current work does not enable construction of such systems from preferences.
VI. Affine Monotonic Functions
For points x, y in R n , write x W y if x i . y i for all i, and write x $ y if x i $ y i for all i. A real-valued function 19 f from a convex set d in R n to R is called affine if f 1tx 1 11 2 t 2 y 2 5 tf 1x2 1 11 2 t 2 f 1y 2 for all x, y in d and t in 10, 12. It is called monotonic if x W y implies f 1x2 . f 1y 2 , and x $ y implies f 1x2 $ f 1y 2 , for all x, y in d. In this section, we prove Proposition B. Readers willing to accept the proposition on faith may proceed to the proof of the main results in the next section.
The origin 10, … , 02 of R n is denoted 0. A linear subspace (or simply subspace) L of R n is a subset of R n that, together with any two points x, y in it, and any real number t, contains x 1 y and tx. A function f on L is linear if f 1x 1 y 2 5 f 1x2 1 f 1y 2 and f 1tx2 5 tf 1x2 for all x, y in L and all real t. Note that a function on L is linear if and only if it is affine. If f is a linear function on L, and t is a constant, then the set 5x [ L : f 1x2 $ t 6 is a (closed) halfspace of L, and the set 5x [ L : f 1x2 5 t 6 is a hyperplane in L; the hyperplane separates two convex subsets d and d9 of L if f 1x2 $ t for all x in d and f 1x2 # t for all x in d9. A polyhedral convex set is the intersection of half-spaces. A linear manifold is a hyperplane in some subspace of R n . The relative interior of a convex set d in R n , denoted ri 1d2 , is its interior relative to the smallest linear manifold containing it. 
PROOF:
R. Tyrrell Rockafellar (1970, Theorem 20 .2).
LEMMA 2: Any monotonic linear function g on a subspace L of R n may be extended to a monotonic linear function on all of R n .
PROOF:
; since g is monotonic, R n 1 does not meet ri 1L_2. As R n 1 is polyhedral, by Lemma 1 there is a hyperplane H in R n that separates R n 1 from L_ and does not include L_; choose the linear function f on R n defining H to be nonnegative on R n 1 , nonpositive on L_. We claim that for each x in L, To see this, suppose first that g 1x2 5 0; then x [ L_, so f 1x2 # 0. Also g 12x2 5 2g 1x2 5 0, so 2x [ L_, so f 12x2 # 0, so f 1x2 $ 0, so f 1x2 5 0. In the opposite direction, let f 1x2 5 0, and suppose that g 1x2 Z 0. Then for any y in L, we have g 1y 2 1g 1y 2/g 1x2 2 x2 5 0, so f 1y 2 1g 1y 2/g 1x2 2 x2 5 0, so f 1y 2 5 1g 1y 2/g 1x2 2 f 1x2 5 0. So H includes all of L, and in particular L_, contrary to what we stipulated; so (7) is proved. Since f is nonpositive on L_, it follows that f and g always have the same sign. Now, choose an x in L with g 1x2 Z 0. Possibly redefining f by multiplication by a positive constant, we may take f 1x2 5 g 1x2. If y is any member of L, then f 1y 2 1 f 1y 2/f 1x2 2 x2 5 f 1y 2 2 f 1y 2 5 0, so g 1y 2 1f 1y 2/f 1x2 2 x2 5 0, so g 1y 2 5 f 1y 2 g 1x2/f 1x2 5 f 1y 2. So f extends g; and it is monotonic, as it is nonnegative on R n 1 and is not constant.
PROOF OF PROPOSITION B:
By possibly applying a translation, we may suppose without loss of generality that 0 [ ri 1d2. Let L be the smallest linear manifold that includes d. Since L contains 0, it is a linear space, and there is a unique extension of g to a linear function g9 on L; as g is monotonic, so is g9. Applying Lemma 2, we obtain an extension f of g9 from L to a linear monotonic function on all of R n . Let f 1x2 5 Ä n i51 q i x i for all x in R n ; all linear functions on R n have this form. The q i cannot all vanish, for then f would be constant; and they are nonnegative, as f is monotonic. This proves 20 the proposition.
VII. Proofs of the Theorems
The idea is to think of the N-M expected utility of a lottery l as an affine monotonic function of the S-vector u 1l S 2 of the utilities u 1l s 2 (Rowena's utility if Colin plays s 2 , and then to apply Proposition B. Subtracting the additive constant q 0 , and 20 The term q 0 is due to the translation at the beginning of the proof. then multiplying by a positive constant so that the other coefficients sum to 1, constitutes a positive linear transformation; so the result still represents Rowena's preferences, and we can think of the coefficients as Rowena's probabilities for Colin's strategies. When the vectors u 1l S 2 span the Euclidean space in which they live, then Proposition B follows from every linear monotonic function on R n having the form Ä n i51 q i x i , with q i $ 0. When they do not span, one applies Lemma 2, which may be of some independent interest; it is not quite straightforward, and we have not found it in the literature.
For the formal proofs, please refer to the formal treatment in Section IV. Set S :5 5s 1 , … , s n 6. With each lottery l in D, associate the point u 1l S 2 :5 1u 1l s 1 2 , … , u 1l s n 2 2 in R n . Let d be the set of all the points u 1l S 2 when l ranges over D; by (2), d is convex. Let w be an N-M utility function for s , , and define f on d by f 1x2 :5 w 1l2 for any l for which u 1l S 2 5 x. That there is such a l follows from x [ d; and by the monotonicity of s , , (1), and (2), f is well-defined as a function of x, and is affine and monotonic. So we may apply Proposition B; by multiplying w by a positive constant, we may take the q i to be nonnegative and sum to 1. Then setting p s i :5 q i yields (3).
The proof of the Auxiliary Theorem is the same, except that D ( 5 D1r < c2 2 is replaced by D1r2 , and u is a utility function for x 2 . To prove the payoff equivalence (4), set u p 1l2 :5 Ä s[S p s u 1l s 2 for all hybrid lotteries l. Suppose that p and p * satisfy (3), and let l be a hybrid lottery. Preference-wise, l must be between the most preferred and the least preferred consequence; so there is a mixed consequence r with l , r. Then (3) yields u p 1l2 5 u p 1r 2 5 u 1r 25 u p * 1r 2 5 u p * 1l2 , which is (4). Luce and Raiffa (1957, 306) were among the earliest 21 to suggest assigning subjective probabilities to an adversary's choices in a strategic game; they wrote as follows: "The problem of individual decision making under uncertainty can be considered a one-person game against a neutral nature. Some of these ideas can be applied indirectly to individual decision making … where the adversary is not neutral but a true adversary. … One modus operandi for the decision maker is to generate an a pri ori probability distribution over the … pure strategies … of his adversary by taking into account both the strategic aspects of the game and … 'psychological' information … about his adversary, and to choose an act which is best against this … distribution." They go on to explore the idea of "side bets" (see the item entitled "Side Bets" in Section VD above), noting some difficulties with it, and informally suggesting a possible way around them. No formal model was developed, and no definite conclusion reached.
VIII. Literature
In the unpublished dissertation of Dreze (1958, 16) , one reads "… it is always possible to formalize the decision problem facing a player in a game of strategy as a game against nature, where states of nature are described with reference to the opponent's strategies. The usefulness of the theory of games of strategy resides in the fact that it helps the player to estimate the probabilities of the various states of nature so defined."
It appears that Walter Armbruster and Werner and Böge and Theo Eisele (1979) were the first to construct formal models in which each player directly 22 assigns subjective probabilities to the strategy choices of the others. A relatively early application of this idea is Brandenburger and Eddie Dekel (1987) . The representation of the value of a game to a player as a subjectively expected utility is implicit in the work of Robert F. Nau and Kevin F. McCardle (1990) .
Joseph B. Kadane and Patrick D. Larkey (1982) wrote that the problem of a player in a game is no different from any other one-person decision problem. In particular, they suggested abandoning altogether all notions of equilibrium. Instead, they proposed simply that each player form, in some unspecified and unrestricted way, a probability distribution over the other players' strategies, and then maximize against that. To form the probabilities, they suggested using disciplines like cognitive psychology rather than decision or game theory.
In the precisely opposite direction, Marco Mariotti (1995 Mariotti ( , 1108 wrote that "a divorce is required between game theory and individual decision theory … strategic decision principles may be radically different from individual decision-theoretic principles." Game G (see display) is an extensive game: if Rowena chooses T, then G9 is played; otherwise, both players get 2. Mariotti argues that in G, a prudent Rowena might well play B, which assures her 2, whereas if she plays T, she might get only 1-her payoff at a reasonable outcome of G9 (the Pareto undominated strict Nash equilibrium 1T9, L92). Then she would also play B in GG9, which is simply the strategic form of G. But in GG9, we may first eliminate TT9, by strong domination; then L9, by weak domination, 23 and then B, as 3 . 2. The perspective of the current work resolves the difficulty. In the abstract, 1T9, L92 indeed cannot be ruled out in G9. But if Rowena chose T in G, it's unlikely that she would choose T9 in G9; presumably Colin realizes this, and Rowena realizes that he 22 Previously, Aumann (1974) had already used subjective probability in analyzing games; but in that analysis, players use "subjectively mixed strategies"-peg their pure strategy choices on events (like outcomes of horse races) whose probability is not agreed upon-rather than simply assigning a subjective probability to the other players' choices. 23 Mariotti uses a slightly different argument for this, but it comes to the same thing. Game G Game G9 Game GG9 does, so she is likely to assign a high probability to L9. When Rowena plays T in G, she's not merely deciding to play G9; she's deciding to play G9 in a situation where she could have gotten 2 for sure. That's an altogether different kettle of fish. Some of the ideas underlying the current work appear already in Mariotti's stimulating paper. Inter alia, that a strategy in a game corresponds to an act in Savage's one-person decision theory; that "only some acts (strategies) are feasible for each player in a given game," and that the players should "rank only the strategies available in that game" (p. 1102).
Finally, Dreze (2005) proposes defining subjective probabilities in strategic games by using only the protagonist's "revealed" preference for the strategy she actually chooses over other strategies available to her.
